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ABSTRACT
This essay is interested in Heidegger’s radical reconception of truth as disclosure and
how this reconception relates to truth as it operates in assertions. This concept of truth derives
from his interpretation of the ancient Greek work for truth, aletheia, which means unhiddeness or
disclosure. Heidegger appropriates this notion of truth to criticize post ancient Greek
philosophy, which advocated the correspondence theory of truth. This theory contends that the
locus of truth lies in an assertion’s correspondence with states of affairs or facts in the world. In
contrast, Heidegger contends that, although correspondence is a way of accessing truth, it is not
the only way, or even the most fundamental way we encounter truth. Rather, truth is most
fundamentally accessed through our everyday Being-in-the-world. This everyday Being-in-theworld discloses instrumentality, which operates through the readiness-to-hand of beings, as the
primordial phenomenon which makes anything like assertional truth possible. Being-in-theworld grounds correspondence theory; therefore, it is mistaken to posit correspondence theory as
the sole bearer of truth. True disclosures arise prior to the assertions that make them explicit. In
order to demonstrate Heidegger’s contention that Being-in-the-world is the fundamental state of
humanity, the first section of the paper is devoted to clarifying and explicating Heidegger’s
argument. The second chapter focuses on Heidegger’s critique of presence-at-hand, and
illustrates how assertions operate within the founded mode of the present-at-hand. The third
chapter provides an in-depth analysis of sections 33 and 44 of Being and Time, in which
Heidegger offers his take on assertions and truth.
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CHAPTER 1: THE PRIMORDIAL PHENOMENON OF THE WORLD
1.1 Introduction
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time is both a radical critique of the philosophical
tradition and an explication of the most fundamental ways we understand our world. In it,
Heidegger contends that the tradition, ranging from Plato to Hegel, has passed over our most
originary understanding of the world by (1) locating the locus of truth in the assertion which has
led to the mistake of (2) conceiving of the world first and foremost in terms of the present-athand. It is for this reason, Heidegger maintains, the tradition has heretofore been unable to
account for the most primordial ways we experience the world. Explicating this primordial
experience is Heidegger’s task in Being and Time, and, in order to do so, he begins his argument
with drastically different premises than the ones we find in most traditional philosophical works.
The question of Being is Heidegger’s starting point, because it is a question that, for the
most part, the tradition has overlooked, taken as self-evident, intentionally ignored, or
misunderstood.
“It is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal and emptiest of concepts. As such it resists
every attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept
require any definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he
means by it” (Heidegger 21).
Heidegger agrees that the concept of Being evades definition, but, rather than ignore the
question altogether, “The indefinability of Being…demands that we look that question in the
face” (Heidegger 23). In order to appropriately explicate the meaning of Being, Heidegger
grants himself the task of examining the various ways there are to be (Braver 165). In Being and
Time his focus remains limited to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, because Dasein is unique in that
it alone is able to raise the question of Being.
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“Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards Being—a relationship which is itself one
of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands
itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly…Understanding of Being
is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being” (Heidegger 32).
Thus, Being and Time is an examination into the being that has a relationship to Being.
Throughout this examination it is important to bear in mind that Heidegger is a
phenomenologist, or one who studies phenomena. A phenomenon, in Heidegger’s context, is a
being which comes to show itself or is brought to light. “Thus we must keep in mind that the
expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself, the manifest” (Heidegger 51).
Phenomenology, then, is the study of that which shows itself. This self-showing is contingent
upon the type of access we have to the entity in question, and, in some cases, Heidegger notes an
entity might show itself as something it is not. When an entity seems to be something that it is
not, this is known as semblance. I might see an entity that I take to be a bush but, upon closer
inspection, I might realize that it is actually a garbage bag. Heidegger also wants to make a
distinction between phenomena and what he calls appearance. Appearance, he tells us, indicates
phenomena which does not show itself but should not be mistaken for phenomena. To illustrate,
consider how physical symptoms are indicative of a particular illness but are not to be confused
with the illness itself (Heidegger 52). Similarly, appearances may indicate a hidden
phenomenon, but this appearance should not be confused with the phenomenon itself.
Semblance and appearance are only possible based on the existence of phenomena as a selfshowing. The three terms: phenomenon, semblance, and appearance are all intricately
connected, and the latter two are grounded in the first; without the notion of phenomena it would
be impossible to have the notions of semblance, as a showing of what it is not, or appearance, as
an indication of what is. Additionally, an understanding of any of these concepts is contingent
upon existence in a world in which phenomena ‘are’.
2

In the process of examining phenomena and the various ways there are to be, Heidegger
must also examine the nature of truth. Since the ancient Greeks, truth and Being have been
intricately related because truth has been equated, starting with Parmenides, with an
understanding of Being (Heidegger 256). It is the phenomenon of truth that discloses various
modes of Being to Dasein. One of the tradition’s most fatal mistakes was the assumption that
truth belonged solely to the assertion. Through this assumption the tradition limited itself to one
way understanding of Being: presence-at-hand. Heidegger staunchly maintains, however, that
presence-at-hand is only one way of Being-in-the-world and it is not the most originary way
Dasein understands the world.
This was not how it began; Ancient Greece, the birthplace of Western philosophy,
conceived of truth as aletheia which Heidegger interprets to mean the uncovering of beings. 1
Considering Heidegger’s phenomenological method, it is unsurprising that truth conceived as
aletheia appealed to him. Aletheia uncovers phenomena, thereby allowing beings to show
themselves.

Aletheia is the negation of the verb lath, to cover over. Thus, for Heidegger, truth

means the uncovering of beings and untruth would be the covering over of beings. Truth in this
context is seen as a derivative of untruth, as its negation. 2 “Here truth is synonymous with the
manifestation of Being and is cast in the context of the human experience as a whole”
(Macomber 151).
“The ‘Being-true’ of the logos as aletheia means that…the entities of which one is talking
must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden;
1

Arguably it was the Roman translators of Greek philosophy who perverted the meaning of aletheia. Regardless of
who the blame falls upon, however, we know that by the time Aquinas was interpreting Aristotle, he definitively
located the locus of truth in the assertion. “Now we do not judge of a thing by what it is accidentally, but by what is
in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, insofar as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect” (Summa Theologica, by
St. Thomas Aquinas).
2
This is in stark contrast to truth as ‘veritas’, the adequation of the intellect with the thing, which is positive and
underivative. Those who conceive of truth as veritas can possess truth, while those who conceive of truth as aletheia
are in its throe.
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that is, they must be discovered. Similarly, ‘Being-false’ amounts to deceiving in the
sense of covering up: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it
be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not” (Heidegger 56-57).
The original meaning of truth for the Greeks was the movement of beings from the hidden into
unhiddeness. For the Greeks, then, truth retained an air of mystery and wonder; the ancient
Greeks were in the throe of truth, not the possessors of it. Aletheia is a phenomenon which is not
inherently tied to assertions but is inherently tied to concrete Being-in-the-world. This
uncovering provided access to Being itself which was not limited solely or even primarily to
presence-at-hand (although presence-at-hand is a means of uncovering). Heidegger appropriates
this notion of uncovering in his analysis of truth in Being and Time. A term which is closely
related to truth is disclosure. 3 Heidegger characterizes disclosure as a ‘laying open’ or ‘the
character of having been laid open’ (Heidegger 105). Though Heidegger waits till later in his
argument to introduce the concept of disclosure, it seems to mean something very similar to
aletheia, and, often in this discussion, the term disclosure will be used to signify uncovering. 4
Just like aletheia, disclosure seems to uncover beings or, at least, aspects of beings. After
introducing this new term, Heidegger seems to use the words uncovering and disclosure
interchangeably and argues that beings in the world can be uncovered or disclosed in certain
ways based upon our Being-towards them. This Being-towards can manifest itself in various
ways, but it comes first and foremost through our pre-reflective, ready-to-hand encounters that
occur through our daily use of beings as equipment, which is a phenomenon that necessarily
arises from Being-in-the-world.
Thus, whereas Kant begins his Critique of Pure Reason, “…by watching a scientist
peering through the lens of a telescope. Heidegger begins by considering man—perhaps Kant’s
3

The introduction of the term disclosure comes in his discussion on circumspective concern.
It is questionable whether or not Heidegger uses the terms interchangeably, and, later in the thesis, this ambiguity
will be addressed.

4
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scientist—shaving, answering the doorbell, shifting his newspaper from one hand to the other in
order to get out money for the bus” (Macomber 34). The argument is: it is these simple everyday
encounters that disclose the Being of the world which makes anything like theoretical knowledge
possible in the first place. Kant, along with the rest of the tradition, failed to acknowledge the
vast importance that simply existing in the world plays in understanding the world at all, let
alone on a theoretical level. Part of Heidegger’s purpose in Being and Time is to bring
philosophy down from the clouds of theoretical speculation back to the world and the
understanding that arises simply from Being-in-the-world.
To make his case, Heidegger begins his argument with the phenomenon of Being-in-theworld. This phenomenon discloses beings primarily as ready-to-hand equipment which aids us
in accomplishing our daily tasks, whether it be building a house or writing a master’s thesis.
Heidegger goes on to explain how assertions are derivative of the phenomenon of Being-in-theworld, and, although they operate as a form of disclosure, they logically cannot be the primary
means of disclosure through which we understand the world. Hence, by claiming that the
assertion provides the first encounter with truth, the tradition has made an egregious error
because it has covered over the more primordial ways in which we encounter truth.
This essay has two purposes: (1) it seeks to explain the relationship between Being and
truth, or truth as world disclosure, rather than mere assertions, and (2) this essay attempts to
understand where and how assertions fit into Heidegger’s overall scheme of Being-in-the-world.
Heidegger argues that assertions are derived from our ready-to-hand encounters that arise from
Being-in-the-world. The ready-to-hand is the most fundamental way in which Being gets
disclosed. Presence-at-hand, which is grounded in the ready-to-hand, is also a disclosure, but
this type of disclosure is only possible based on the ready-to-hand. Assertions most often arise
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from present-at-hand disclosures and are disclosive in their own right. Hence, Heidegger is not
anti-assertion or anti-presence-at-hand by any means. He simply wants to relegate these
phenomena to their proper place as founded modes that arise from the ready-to-hand, which is a
phenomenon that has been passed over time and time again by the tradition.
What I am specifically interested in examining in this essay is the truth of assertions as
they are characterized by Heidegger. Using Heidegger’s claims, I will illustrate the derivative
nature of assertions, and I will try to fill in some of the gaps Heidegger leaves in his somewhat
brief analysis. To aid me in my efforts, I will closely examine sections 33 and 44 of Being and
Time which respectively provide analyses of assertions and truth. Additionally I will compare
my findings with Heidegger scholar Daniel Dahlstrom’s reading of Being and Time to see if his
arguments can help elucidate Heidegger’s somewhat minimal analysis. Many of mine and
Dahlstrom’s claims will have to go above and beyond what Heidegger argues in Being in Time
for he never explicitly makes some of these distinctions, and his examples are minimal and lack
context.
To set up Heidegger’s argument for the derivative nature of assertions it will be
necessary to examine some of the fundamental structures of Dasein laid out in the first division,
for it is these structures which make anything like asserting possible in the first place. Also, it
will be necessary to explain Heidegger’s critique of the tradition’s passing over these
fundamental structures because it was this passing over which led us to privilege the assertion as
the locus of truth in the first place. Additionally, I will discuss Heidegger’s renegade
interpretation of Aristotle and how this interpretation informs his understanding of truth and
assertions. When we discuss Heidegger’s analysis of truth it will also be necessary to discuss
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Husserl’s notion of intuition and judgment for this is the context Heidegger is working from.
Finally, the last section of the essay will deal with assertions as derivative disclosures of truth.
1.2 Dasein and Its World
To begin, it will be helpful to represent some of the claims Heidegger makes in Being
and Time that inform his understanding of assertions. Heidegger thinks that the tradition has
passed over the most primordial way we understand and encounter the world. Therefore, much
of the first division of Being and Time is spent critiquing the tradition and providing what
Heidegger considers a more appropriate analysis of our most fundamental experiences with the
world. The following chapter will focus on explicating the aspects of Heidegger’s analysis that
are relevant to his understanding of assertions as a derivative form of disclosure.
First of all, when Heidegger speaks of man he avoids using any reference to a self or an
ego; instead he uses the term ‘Dasein’. Dasein signifies our most primordial mode of Being:
immersion in a world of circumspective concern. Heidegger refuses to use the words most
commonly designated to refer to humans because these words are tied too closely to the tradition
and its privileging of the present-at-hand. To assert an ‘I’ is already to have passed over the
primordial phenomenon of Being-in-the-world, because when Dasein is wholly engaged in its
world, there is no ego. The ego only comes into play when we begin thinking of ourselves
theoretically as present-at-hand.
“If we carefully describe our normal experience of engaged daily dealings, we find no
ego there; it is only theoretical speculation on what we assume must have been the case
that retrospectively injects a doer back into the deed…the ‘I’ is not a primary
phenomenon but only arises from specific situations and assumptions” (Braver 209).
The argument is that Dasein, primordially, is immersed in its world. The phenomenon of Dasein
manifests itself, most often, when it is using an entity as a ready-to-hand tool; it loses itself in the
operations it is performing. However, this claim should not be taken to mean that Dasein is first
7

conscious of itself as a self and then becomes lost in the world of circumspective concern,
through the ready-to-hand; this characterization too closely resembles the subject/object
distinction that Heidegger is trying to escape. Rather, Dasein is immersed first and foremost in
its world, meaning that the ready-to-hand is the first encounter with the world and notions of the
self can only arise after and as a result of this immersion.
Dasein is also that being that is “there with it” (Macomber 30), meaning that Dasein is
the being that is there alongside the world that not only experiences the world but makes the
world possible through its various states of Being-in-the-world. Dasein’s existence is completely
and utterly wrapped up with its concrete Being-in-the-world; it is defined by its Being-in-theworld, not by some lofty ideals about what it might mean to be a self. Moreover, Dasein is not
so much a particular being that exists in the world in the same way a mineral exists (Heidegger
82). Rather, Dasein is a way of Being, and this way of Being is constituted by a dynamic
relationship to Being. Dasein is an active knower, not a passive one (Braver 209).
“In essence Dasein is not a particular being but a relation to Being itself. It is not
primarily a what. What is the primary characteristic of all the beings discovered within
the world, but it does not apply to the being whose Being consists in the activity of
discovery itself” (Macomber 31).
What makes Dasein unique from other beings is that Dasein is the only being capable of
engaging in an inquiry into the nature of Being. This fundamentally changes the relationship
Dasein would have to any other being in the world, because Dasein alone is capable of
interpreting and contextualizing beings. Dasein could have an attitude to a rock, for instance, 5
but a rock cannot have an attitude towards another rock.

5

It is irrelevant whether this is an attitude of fascination, frustration, or indifference; the key point is Dasein’s
capability of having any attitude at all is distinctive of its existence in the world.
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Additionally, it will be helpful if we examine what precisely Heidegger means by the
term ‘world’ since it will be used frequently in this discussion. In division one of Being and
Time, Heidegger establishes four different ways in which the term ‘world’ might be used. The
first and perhaps most common way ‘world’ is defined is as the, “…totality of those entities
which can be present-at-hand within the world,” (Heidegger 93). This is how many thinkers in
the tradition conceived of world. World can also be used to designate various hermeneutical
frameworks. For instance, we could talk about the world of philosophy, the world of zoology, or
the world of politics. Each of these worlds operates under different presuppositions about reality
and the term ‘world’ serves to reveal the various viewpoints in operation within each respective
‘world’.
Thirdly, we might conceive of the world simply as the place where Dasein resides. This
denotation includes within it all the hermeneutical frameworks mentioned in the second
definition. Additionally, this signification does not merely refer to the fact that Dasein is in the
world; it also refers to the way in which Dasein structures its world through dynamic interaction.
In light of this it might be a little misleading to assert that Dasein is in the world. This claim
might lead us to think that Dasein is in the world in the same way a shoe is in a closet or a spoon
is in a drawer, but this would be an inaccurate characterization (Heidegger 79). Rather, Dasein is
in the world in the sense that it interacts with and is actively concerned about the world. “Dasein
is in the world in the sense in which the broker is in stocks and bonds” (Macomber 33, his
emphasis).
And, finally, ‘world’ can also be conceived of as the, “…ontologico-existential concept
of worldhood” (Heidegger 93, his emphasis). The notion of worldhood is intimately tied with
the third signification of world because it is worldhood that constitutes the world’s various ways
9

of Being in the third sense. For instance, when operating in the world Dasein is capable of
perceiving entities within it as either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Worldhood is the
ontological structure that makes it possible for Dasein to switch back and forth from ready-tohand to present-at-hand (concepts that will be elaborated upon momentarily) while world in the
third sense is the ontic structure which comprises the entities that are either ready-to-hand or
present-at-hand. Thus the fourth signification grounds the third signification.
The distinction between world in the third and fourth senses will become clearer if we
distinguish between the ontological (the worldhood of the world) and the ontical (the world).
Heidegger begins Being and Time with the argument that the entire tradition of philosophy has
been guilty of conflating Being with beings (Heidegger 31). In other words, the tradition has
assumed that Being as an abstract notion can be equated with beings that exist concretely.
Heidegger contends that, on the contrary, Being is not a being; in fact, Being is not a thing at all
(Braver 165). Rather, Being is the dynamic ‘how’ of beings that pervades and grounds the way
everything in the world, including Dasein, ‘is’. Heidegger characterizes the difference between
Being and beings as ontological and ontical. The ontological refers to the way in which Being
structures the world, while the ontical refers to actual concrete beings that exist in the world. For
instance, the notion of equipmentality as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand is ontological, while
the notion of a particular item that is operating as either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand is
ontical.
Heidegger establishes that he will invoke the term ‘world’ to mean the third signification:
the place in which Dasein resides and actively participates in its surroundings.
“The world in Heidegger’s sense is not the name of a place or a term signifying some
imaginative totality of things. It is more a generic notion than a name and it refers to the
field in which human activity takes place…[it is] the necessary implication of Dasein’s
most immediate daily preoccupations” (Macomber 42).
10

His purpose for using ‘world’ in this manner is to phenomenologically explicate how Dasein
exists in the world by exploring disclosure as it operates at its most fundamental levels
(Heidegger 91-95).
The possibility for experiencing truth as disclosure arises out of Dasein’s Being-in-theworld. Being-in-the-world is the term Heidegger coins to designate a ‘unitary phenomenon’
which helps to constitute the uniqueness of Dasein’s existence (Heidegger 78). This term
expresses that Dasein is first and foremost in a world of circumspective concern from which it
cannot divorce itself. Rational thought presupposes this existence in the world, because it is
Being-in-the-world that provides Dasein with the possibility of rational thought. Dasein is
defined and limited by its Being-in-the-world; it is not free-floating souls that just happen to be
attached to a body which just happens to exist in the world (i.e. like Descartes’ pilot in the ship).
Dasein’s existence and its Being-in-the-world are inseparable. Therefore an understanding of the
world is only possible on our basis of Being-in-the-world. This is why Heidegger implements
dashes between words; the dashes signify the interconnectedness of the terms, which, in turn,
signifies the interconnectedness of Dasein’s existence to the world.
“Dasein is never ‘proximally’ an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but
which sometimes has the inclination to take up a ‘relationship’ towards the world.
Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-inthe-world, is as it is (Heidegger 84).
Our understanding of beings arises out of the ‘as’ structure; a structure which makes
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand disclosures possible and sets the stage for assertions. The ‘as’
structure signifies a primarily tacit way of understanding entities in the world, and it is this tacit
understanding which provides the foundation for making assertions (Dahlstrom 187). The idea is
that our understanding of our day-to-day world is covert; it is covert in the sense that we are so
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accustomed to the entities we encounter on a daily basis that we seldom find it necessary to
overtly devote our thoughts to them. Instead our overt thoughts remain focused on the projects
that are important to us. Dahlstrom refers to this understanding as pre-predicative and prereflective (Dahltsrom 187). We tacitly take entities to be ‘as’ whatever they need to be (and are
capable of being) in relation to our context. Thus, when I walk through the door of Coates Hall,
I tacitly understand the door ‘as’ an entryway. The term ‘as’ denotes the way in which I seize
upon an entity as a means of accomplishing some task or achieving some end (Dahlstrom 187).
Heidegger’s argument is that this is the most original way we experience the world. “The things
that one deals with are always already uncovered on the basis of ‘what they are for’ or ‘where
they are supposed to help us get to’” (Dahlstrom 186).
It is this original experience which provides the basis for assertions. However, because
our understanding of the world is primarily tacit, we often find it unnecessary to verbalize the
disclosures we gain from the experiences we have with the entities we encounter in our day-today life. One might find it odd, for instance, if they saw me stop and say, “This door is an
entryway into Coates Hall”. Because my understanding of the doorway as an entryway is so
fundamental to my everyday existence, there is no need to explicate it (Dahlstrom 187).
“Interpretation is carried out primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action of
circumspective concern—laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, ‘without
wasting words’. From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that
interpretation is absent” (Heidegger 200).
Under this view, then, the most sensible way to express my understanding of the door to Coates
Hall is not to make an assertion but simply to open it up and walk through.
As Being-in-the-world, Dasein, for the most part, encounters entities as ready-to-hand
equipment; this is the phenomenon of instrumentality that arises from the ‘as’ structure. When
Dasein operates in a ready-to-hand mode of Being, it is not able to perceive of things in the
12

world in a vacuum. Rather everything in the world works together in a contextual network, or a
totality of equipment (Heidegger 98). For example when one walks into a room, “What we
encounter as closest to us is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’
in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing” (Heidegger 98). Thus, when I walk
into my bedroom, I do not encounter each entity in my bedroom separately and theoretically.
Instead I perceive of the contextual whole of my bedroom. Each item works together in a
circumspective network to form the equipmental totality of my bedroom. Like the ‘as’ structure,
the ready-to-hand approach to understanding entities is pre-reflective, pre-predicative, and
pragmatic. It is pragmatic in the sense that we primarily understand entities as ready-to-hand
because we need them for some practical purpose. I need my lamp in order to light up my
bedroom; I need my table in order to set the lamp on; I need my bedroom in order to have a place
to put all my stuff. Moreover, because our focus tends to remain on a larger project, these readyto-hand entities are very seldom thematized in our thoughts or our words. “The kind of dealing
which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind
of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use…” (Heidegger 95).
To illustrate the ready-to-hand, imagine a college freshmen diligently taking notes in an
introductory level philosophy course. This young woman is not only a good student; she is also
very taken by the thought provoking material. The entities which are physically closest to her
are her pen and her notebook, both of which she needs in order to take notes. However, even
though these objects are closest to her, they are also the last thing on her mind; they are
ontologically farthest from her (Heidegger 96). This woman is so caught up in the lecture
material and in her project of taking notes, that she is not overtly aware of her pen or her
notebook; these items are ready-to-hand. She has taken them up as useful tools or equipment in
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order to achieve her end of taking notes. Subsequently, her relationship to the pen and the
notebook has become primordial, and she has encountered these beings as hidden in their
usefulness (Heidegger 96, 98). It would not be accurate to say that the woman perceives of the
pen and notebook as things; her use of the pen and notebook for some larger purpose precludes
her from thinking of these objects as objects (Heidegger 96). They are simply tools she takes up
with only a tacit awareness, and these tools operate in terms of a contextual whole; each item
being utilized (i.e. the pen, the notebook, the desk, the classroom, the building, etc.) works
together to create this whole. Despite the physical presence of all of these entities the woman’s
overt awareness remains focused on her larger project. “In dealings such as this, where
something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which is constitutive
for the equipment we are employing at the time…” (Heidegger 98).
Now suppose further, that about half-way through the class this young woman loses
interest in the lecture. To entertain herself she begins to closely examine her pen. She takes note
of the brand, the shape, the color etc. At this point, the pen is no longer ready-to-hand; instead it
has become present-at-hand. In other words, the pen is no longer operating as a tool for some
larger purpose. It has become an overt object of interest, meaning that it has been taken out of its
ready-hand-context and conceived of as a present thing in the world. Heidegger maintains that
one of philosophy’s biggest oversights has been to disregard the phenomenon of the ready-tohand and to focus solely on the present-at-hand (Heidegger 122). 6 This oversight has been to our
detriment because, as a result, we have failed to recognize the most primary way that we
encounter objects in the world. As Heidegger points out, we tend to remain focused on some
larger project, and we take up objects as ready-to-hand to serve this project. Thus, just as

6

For example, when Descartes discusses his perceptions of the wax candle on his table in the Meditations, he
conceives of the wax as a present-at-hand, theoretical object.
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assertions are grounded in primordial disclosure, the present-at-hand is grounded in the ready-tohand.
As Heidegger characterizes it, the phenomenon of viewing objects as present-at-hand
most often occurs when our project is interrupted for some reason, or when the tool ceases to
serve its intended purpose.
“When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely readyto-hand may be met as something unusable…When its unusability is thus discovered,
equipment becomes conspicuous…Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such
equipment…” (Heidegger 103).
Present-at-hand entities can also make themselves known by being absent in a time of need. The
moment I need a pen, for instance, and am unable to find one, I have conceived of the pen as
present-at-hand. Moreover, the thing I need the missing tool for will also become present-athand. In this case, suppose I need to sign a form and I do not have a pen. Now the pen and the
form have become present-at-hand to me as I am left to throw my hands up in frustration at my
inability to complete my project.
“The more urgently we need what is missing, all the more obtrusive does that which is
ready-to-hand become…It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more,
which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing…”(Heidegger 103).
Finally, the presence-at-hand of beings can announce itself as something that stands in our way
and demands to be dealt with before continuing with one’s project.
“That to which our concern refuses to turn, that for which it has ‘no time’, is something
un-ready-to hand in the manner of what does not belong here, of what has not been
attended to” (Heidegger 103).
From these three types of presence-at-hand, Heidegger concludes that, “…the presenceat-hand of which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment”
(Heidegger 104). Each of these types of presence-at-hand arises from what was encountered
primordially as ready-to-hand, which makes it appear as though Heidegger is positing that
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presence-at-hand is only possible based on readiness-to-hand. He goes on to argue that what
makes presence-at-hand, in all three of the cases cited, possible is the interruption of Dasein’s
projects. These interruptions occur when the equipment Dasein is utilizing breaks down, and,
when this happens, “…the constitutive assignment of the ‘in-order-to’ to a ‘towards-this’ has
been disturbed”; the ready-to-hand is then taken from its context (Heidegger 105).
Subsequently, the project which Dasein is engaged in becomes explicit as a project and the
present-at-hand comes to the fore. Presence-at-hand “lights up the world”, but, if the world is lit
up, then, Heidegger avers, it must have been disclosed, and it has been disclosed through the
ready-to-hand which is accessible through circumspective concern (Heidegger 106).
Consequently, Heidegger concludes that readiness-to-hand is a fundamental aspect of Being-inthe-world, as it is readiness-to-hand that signifies a familiarity with the world, while presence-athand is generally only possible based on the breaks in the referential totality of circumspective
concern that comprise the ready-to-hand.
The above analysis strongly suggests that presence-at-hand can only arise directly from a
ready-to-hand experience in the world, and, in paragraphs fifteen and sixteen of Being and Time
this is seemingly the argument Heidegger makes. But, if presence-at-hand only arises through
the breakdown of a tool, this would imply that thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and
Descartes’ philosophies all arose due to a breakdown in equipment. This seems like a very
strange, counter-intuitive argument to make, and if we examine Heidegger’s earlier portrayal of
Being-in-the-world we can see that presence-at-hand is a bit more complex. In this section,
Heidegger speaks of a presence-at-hand that arises, not from a concrete experience with a readyto-hand tool that breaks down, but from Being-in-the-world more generally.
“When concern holds back from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it
puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just
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tarrying alongside…this kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us encounter
entities within-the-world purely in the way they look, just that; on the basis of this kind of
Being, and as a mode of it, looking explicitly at what we encounter is possible”
(Heidegger 88, his emphasis).
This passage suggests that presence-at-hand views of the world can arise for a multitude of
reasons other than the experience of simply having a tool break down. One’s holding back from
the ready-to-hand and tarrying alongside could arise from other phenomena such as boredom,
wonder, or reflexivity. All of these attitudes towards beings can result in a present-at-hand view
of Dasein’s world. However, one must always bear in mind Heidegger’s key point: regardless of
how it manifests itself, present-at-hand views of the world are only possible based on the
originary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world, a phenomenon which, in turn, most often
manifests itself in terms of readiness-to-hand.
“When Dasein directs itself toward something and grasps it, it does not somehow
first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but
its primary kind of Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities
which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered” (Heidegger
89).
All experiences Dasein has with the world whether it be a ready-to-hand or a present-at-hand
encounter, are based on the unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world.
The structures Heidegger lays out in division one of Being and Time are indicative of a
radical yet stunningly simple insight: theoretical knowledge is only possible based on our
concrete Being-in-the-world. Heidegger contends that by ignoring the ready-to-hand, the
tradition has failed to recognize our most fundamental encounters with the world. As a result,
“We have become disconnected from the deep structure that defines us…the point of the book is
to put us back in touch with the meaning of our Being in addition to the meaning of Being per
se” (Braver 164). In other words, when the tradition conceives of the world first and foremost as
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present-at-hand, they completely and utterly pass over Dasein’s most fundamental experience
with the world as ready-to-hand.
1.3 The Correspondence Theory and Aristotle
Much of Heidegger’s argument in Being and Time arises out of his belief that the
correspondence theory of truth mistakenly privileges the assertion as the locus of truth. It should
be noted that Heidegger does not outright disagree with the notion of the correspondence of the
world with an assertion; correspondence is quite useful when operating in the realm of presenceat-hand and theoretical knowledge. However, traditionally, correspondence theorists have
wanted to claim that correspondence provides our sole access to truth, and Heidegger thinks that
this view is mistaken because it closes us off to truth as it occurs through the ready-to-hand.
Generally speaking, the correspondence theory of truth refers to the correspondence of
the thing with the intellect (Marian). In other words, if what is stated in the assertion
corresponds to the way the world actually is, then it can be said to be a true assertion.
“It [correspondence theory] defines truth as the correspondence between thoughts, ideas,
beliefs, words, propositions sentences, or languages on the one hand, and things, objects,
states of affairs, configurations, reality, or experience between the other; that is, between
something on the side of the mind or language and something on the side of the world”
(Braver 15, my emphasis).
Although Heidegger acknowledges correspondence as a legitimate encounter with truth,
he does not define it as correspondence because this definition would limit truth to the above
characterization. The problems with correspondence theory are the metaphysical
presuppositions that underlie it. In order for one to claim that a state of affairs corresponds to a
proposition, one must be conceiving of the world primarily as present-at-hand, and, as has been
established, this is not the most primary way the world is experienced; it is a founded mode.
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Thus to restrict the definition of truth as the correspondence of the subject with its object is to
simultaneously deny or forget truth as it occurs through the ready-to-hand.
In contrast to traditional correspondence theory, Heidegger claims that assertions are only
possible based on more fundamental disclosures of being. It is our Being-in-the-world and our
everyday, ready-to-hand encounters that are entailed in Being-in-the-world which make
propositional truth possible. “…just as the present-at-hand is grounded in the ready-to-hand, so
its correlate assertional or propositional truth is also parasitic on a more fundamental form of
truth” (Braver 200). For Heidegger, propositions do not insert themselves into our primordial
experiences of truth; they only arise after truth has already been encountered through the Beingin-the-world. Uncovering beings in the most primordial sense is not a matter of discovering a
true proposition; rather, it is a matter of taking up ready-to-hand tools as equipment, a
phenomenon which precedes the very possibility of something like propositional truth.
This theory of truth is usually traced back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1011b25 where he
says, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is
that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” (Marian). Although this definition does not
specifically lay out the correspondence theory, (it merely invokes a relation between truth and
assertions) it has been traditionally taken as its foundations (Marian).
Part of what enables Heidegger to provide such a drastic critique of the tradition is that he
also traces his version of truth back to Aristotle. 7 He claims that his interpretation of Aristotle is
more faithful to the Greek conception of truth, aletheia, and, by mistakenly interpreting Aristotle
as a correspondence theorist, the tradition has been perverting truth for centuries.
“If, as has become quite customary nowadays, one defines ‘truth’ as something that
‘really’ pertains to judgment, and if one then invokes the support of Aristotle with this
7

Actually, he traces it back to Parmenides but in Section 44 he invokes Aristotle to support his claims for truth as
uncovering.
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thesis, not only is this unjustified, but, above all, the Greek conception of truth has been
misunderstood” (Heidegger 57).
Aristotle, Heidegger tells us, never explicitly located truth in the assertion. Rather, in Book
Theta of the Metaphysics he says that logos, “…is that of Being in which Dasein can either
uncover or cover up,” (Heidegger 268, his emphasis). All assertions, therefore, which come out
of rational thinking contain a “double possibility”; they can conceal or they can reveal. Making
a theoretical assertion about a pen might reveal a definite aspect of the pen while simultaneously
covering over another aspect. Heidegger thus concludes that, like himself, Aristotle determined
the assertion in view of the truth and not vice versa (Dahlstrom 181).
Additionally, the question of the truth or falsity of an assertion can only be meaningfully
posed to someone who already understands what it is for something to be true or false; hence,
Aristotle’s very definition of assertions presupposes a more primordial concept of truth
(Dahlstrom 181).
“According to Aristotle, a sentence’s possibility of being true or false presupposes that it
contains a synthesis. The basis of this synthesis lies not in some combination of words or
concepts, but what the sentence or assertion is about: the entity itself…its manner of
making itself present” (Dahlstrom 211).
This is akin to Heidegger’s claim that Being-in-the-world is a pre-condition for the ability to
make assertions. It is only through Being-in-the-world that entities are capable of Being present;
hence we can see that, contrary to what the tradition has contended, Heidegger and Aristotle
seem to be in agreement on this issue.
Despite Aristotle’s recognition of truth as uncovering, he ultimately falls prey to the same
privileging of presence as his predecessor (Plato) and his followers (Roman, Medieval, and
Modern thinkers) because he still conceives of being in its most pure sense as what is actual as
opposed to what is not-yet actual (Dahlstrom 214).
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The highest level of ontological consideration is attained by Aristotle in the second part
of the chapter [Book Theta Chapter 10] as simple fully actual (on hand) being is
identified with truth (uncoveredness)” (Dahlstrom 214).
Thus, Aristotle is still thinking of Being and therefore truth, in its most pure form, as a matter of
deriving the essence from something that is on hand. As we have seen, this is not the case for
Heidegger. For Heidegger, Being and truth are most primordially encountered through the
ready-to-hand use of tools as equipment. When we use tools as equipment they are not present
to us in the sense that Aristotle means. What is most present is the project which we are working
towards; the physically present beings which are encountered are understood in terms of the
project and not in terms of their essences. Though, according to Heidegger, Aristotle recognizes
the necessity of the uncovering of beings in regard to understanding their truth, he only
conceives of uncovering in the sense of uncovering something that is on hand; thus he fails to
recognize or account for the uncovering that comes from taking up tools to aid us in our projects.
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CHAPTER 2: PRIVILEGING THE PRESENT-AT-HAND
2.1 Heidegger’s Critique of Descartes
Philosophers have been conceiving of the world primarily as present-at-hand since
Plato 8; Aristotle, the Romans, and the medieval philosophers carried on this tradition. Part of
Heidegger’s purpose in Being and Time is to illustrate what is lost in this understanding of the
world, namely the ready-to-hand mode of Being which is the primary way the world is
experienced by Dasein.
Elsewhere in his works, Heidegger places blame for the oversight of the ready-to-hand
in favor of the present-at-hand on Plato, Aristotle, and the medieval thinkers 9, however, in Being
and Time Heidegger places the blame for the privileging of the present-at-hand most decisively
on Descartes’ shoulders. It is Descartes, he argues, that helped to provide the basis for our belief
that the world is primarily encountered as present-at-hand (Heidegger 128). This is because
Descartes, taking his cue from medieval thinkers 10, first and foremost conceived of the world as
present-at-hand and completely passed over the phenomenon of the ready-to-hand.
Descartes thought that we understood the world in terms of bodily things (res corporea).
He referred to those bodily things in the world as substances (Heidegger 123). In the Principles
of Philosophy, Descartes establishes that substance refers to both the Being of an entity and the
entity itself (PP 52). Moreover, in order to determine the essence of substance one must
elucidate things insofar as they are substances, which, for Descartes, means that we must

8

For instance, in Book 10 of The Republic, when Plato discusses appearance vs. reality he uses the example of a
stick placed in water. “And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in
the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colors to which sight is liable.” This is just
one instance of Plato conceiving of a being in the world as first and foremost present-at-hand. He has covered over
the readiness-to-hand of the stick.
9
See his essay on The Essence of Truth or his Lectures on Parmenides.
10
For a thorough explication of Descartes’ use of medieval ideas see Francois Raffoul’s Heidegger and the Subject,
chapter three.
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examine a thing’s attributes. It is only through a thing’s attributes that the thing itself becomes
accessible.
“And though substance is indeed known by some attribute yet for each substance there is
pre-eminently one property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all the
rest are referred” (PP 53).
Attributes are only able to make themselves present in terms of extension. In other
words, a substance must have spatial dimensions in order to be grasped, and it is these
substances, that are apprehended through extension, which make up the world. “Extension—
namely, in length, breadth, and thickness—makes up the real being of that corporeal substance
which we call the ‘world’” (Heidegger 123). Thus the world can be characterized not only as
bodily things (res corporea) but also as extended things (res extensa). Extension is “assigned” to
the corporeal thing in order to make it graspable to the ego or the self. For Descartes, extension
and substance mean the same thing for material things.
Descartes claims that just because a corporeal body in the world changes in location does
not mean that it changes in extension. For instance, consider the second meditation in
Meditations on First Philosophy, where he discusses the piece of wax. As the wax melts from
the fire it will change in shape, length, and depth, however, its extension will not change.
“Take, for example, this piece of wax; it is quite fresh, having been but recently taken
from the beehive; it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained…In fine, all
that contributes to make a body as distinctly known as possible, is found in the one before
us…let it be placed near the fire--what remained of the taste exhales, the smell
evaporates, the color changes, its figure is destroyed, its size increases, it becomes liquid,
it grows hot…Does the same wax still remain after this change ? It must be admitted that
it does remain; no one doubts it, or judges otherwise” (M 2.11).
Although the wax has the capacity to completely change in appearance, Descartes decisively
concludes that it remains essentially the same; it remains an extended, bodily thing. The
question then becomes: how can he know that the wax is still wax if its corporeal properties are
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constantly changing? He concludes in section 54 of Principles of First Philosophy that it is
through his rational intuition that he can discern the being of corporeal things through their
extension.
In Principles of Philosophy section 51, Descartes defines the Being of a substance, “as an
entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be” (Heidegger 125, his
emphasis). Pretty clearly this definition can only refer to God, or ens perfectissimum, since all
other substances are derived from some other substance (Raffoul 57). God, then, represents
substance in its most perfect form, while other substances fall under the category of needing to
be “produced” and “sustained” either by God or by man. Descartes has now conceived of being
within the widest possible range; it, “…ranges from the production of what is to be present-athand to something which has no need of being produced” (Heidegger 125). The difference
between the wax candle and God is infinite and, yet, we still characterize them both as entities
that be. “We are thus using ‘Being’ in so wide a sense that its meaning embraces an ‘infinite’
difference” (Heidegger 125).
The different types of being, for Descartes, become even more pronounced when we
bring in his notion of man as res cogitans (thinking thing). At this point in the argument, we
have three types of substances: (1) corporeal or extended substance (things) (2) a thinking thing
which is causa sui (God) and (3) thinking things which are causata (man). As I mentioned
above, the problem with characterizing all three of these substances as being is that it makes it
difficult to distinguish between the way God is, the way the world is, and the way man is.
Clearly these various uses of the term ‘is’ are not univocal because if that were the case, “…then
what is created would be viewed as it were uncreated, or the uncreated would be reduced to the
status of something created” (Heidegger 126). Descartes gets around this difficult by refusing to
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get around it. He says, “No signification of this name [substance or being] which would be
common to God and his creation can be distinctly understood” (PP 51). Descartes refuses to
engage the question of Being because he thinks that it is beyond human understanding. This
evasion leads Heidegger to accuse him of ignoring the question of Being altogether, which turns
out to be problematic because his discussion of substance demands that he address the question
of Being.
“This evasion is tantamount to his failing to discuss the meaning of Being which the idea
of substantiality embraces, or the character of the ‘universality’ which belongs to this
signification…Thus the possibility of a pure problematic of Being gets renounced in
principle, and a way is sought for arriving at those definite characteristics of substance
which we have designated above” (Heidegger 126).
Descartes is discussing Being even though he admittedly does not really understand it.
Since he claims that Being is not accessible through an entity, he must claim that it is accessible
through an entity’s attributes. Entities’ attributes are only made apparent through a present-athand examination of them. 11 Therefore, Descartes’ ontology requires him to posit the world first
and foremost as present-at-hand.
Moreover, Descartes privileges mathematical and scientific approaches to the world
which also favor presence-at-hand over readiness-to-hand. “Mathematical knowledge is
regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give
assurance that their Being has been securely grasped” (Heidegger 128). He privileges math
because he privileges intellect. In the second meditation Descartes argues that neither the senses
nor the imagination are able to grasp the nature of the body; since the wax can subsist through
physical changes, only the mind or intellect is up to such a task. “I must therefore admit that the
nature of this piece of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the
11

When I am approaching entities as ready-to-hand I am only concerned with an entities’ attributes insofar as they
are useful to helping me complete my project. Thus it is only when I examine an entity as present-at-hand that I can
devote my focus to the entity’s attributes.
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mind alone” (M 2.12). Thus, “The appropriate mode of access that Descartes grants to beings,
determined on the basis of extension, is intellectio, in the form of the ‘kind of knowledge we get
in mathematics and physics’” (Raffoul 66). The privileging of mathematics arises from
Descartes’ desire to conceive of entities in their essence or as they subsist (Raffoul 66). In other
words, for Descartes, “That which remains really is. This is the sort of thing which mathematics
knows” (Heidegger 128).
“…he prescribes for the world its ‘real’ Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being
whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own
right—an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand. Thus his
ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a
science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather by his ontological orientation
in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge
is particularly well suited to grasp” (Heidegger 129).
Heidegger asks as the beginning of paragraph 21:
“…does this ontology of the ‘world’ seek the phenomenon of the world at all, and if not,
does it at least define some entity within-the-world fully enough so that the worldly
character of this entity can be made visible in it?” (Heidegger 128).
Heidegger determines that the answer to both of these questions is no. By conceiving of
the world first and foremost as extended things, Descartes has privileged the present-at-hand and
completely covered over the more primordial phenomenon of the ready-to-hand. What
Descartes has failed to understand, Heidegger tells us, is that the extension of an entity in the
world can only be grasped if one has encountered it first and foremost as ready-to-hand.
This criticism can best be illustrated through Descartes’ use of the wax as an example for
clear and distinct knowledge of Being. In the second meditation Descartes takes a present-athand approach to the wax when he attempts to characterize its essence. What Descartes failed to
consider was his usual, everyday approach to the wax. When he was writing the first meditation,
for instance, he was probably making ready-to-hand use of his wax candle. He probably had lit
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it so that he would be able to see what he was writing, which means that he was approaching the
wax candle as a ready-to-hand piece of equipment which was aiding him in his project of
philosophizing. As he wrote the first meditation, he was undoubtedly aware of the candle on
some level, but only insofar as it was useful for his project of writing his philosophy. It was not
until he needed to discuss the wax candle in order to help him in his second meditation that it
became present-at-hand. Thus Descartes’ primary way of dealing with the candle as a source of
light and warmth was so fundamental to his everyday projects that, in writing his ontology, it did
not even occur to him that he should address this everyday manner of Being.
Were Descartes to attempt to provide an account for the ready-to-hand, he would do so
by speaking of it in terms of the present-at-hand. He might try and argue, for instance, that the
wax is grasped in its present-at-hand essence prior to its possibility of its being utilized as a tool.
This, however, is a poor phenomenological account of how Dasein actually interacts with its
world. Heidegger’s account of the ready-to-hand, in paragraph 15 of Being and Time, more aptly
illustrates Dasein’s actual, everyday dealings with beings in the world. A simple reflection on
one’s own encounters with ready-to-hand equipment should reveal that conceiving of beings in
their essences is hardly a prerequisite for using them as tools for some practical end. Recall the
experience the woman had with her pen when she was taking notes. There was no need for her
to conceive to the pen in its essence in order for her to take notes. In fact, had she conceived of
her pen first and foremost in its essence, her note-taking project would have been hindered as she
would have been unable to think theoretically about both her pen and the material being taught
simultaneously. Thus Descartes’ argument is left feeling somewhat hollow, as it does not
provide as rich an account of the human experience in the world as Heidegger’s. In failing to
address the ready-to-hand grounds for beings, Descartes also failed to understand the primary
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way in which humans grasp reality, meaning that his ontology, which reduces all concrete beings
to present-at-hand, provides an utterly inadequate understanding of the human experience of
Being-in-the-world.
“…his [Descartes’] Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him
to pass over both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities within the
world which are proximally ready-to-hand” (Heidegger 128).
Ultimately, what makes Heidegger’s framework more appealing is its ability to provide a
richer and therefore phenomenologically superior account of the human experience. Descartes’
starting point in his Meditations on First Philosophy requires him to posit a mind/body dualism,
a distinction which has caused a philosophical quagmire for centuries. Philosophers who have
inherited Descartes’ legacy have struggled with the questions of how the mind and the body
relate and how we can know there is a world at all. Because Heidegger posits Being-in-theworld as more primordial than the rational self, he is able to avoid many of the philosophical pitfalls Descartes finds himself in. Subsequently, Heidegger is boldly dismissive of Descartes’
approach:
“The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved,
makes no sense if it is raised by Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise
it? Furthermore, it is encumbered with a double signification…But the world is disclosed
essentially along with the Being of Dasein; with the disclosedness of the world, the
‘world’ has in each case been discovered too” (Heidegger 247).
In Heidegger’s view raising the question of the external world is absurd when it is Beingin-the-world that makes rational thought possible in the first place. Perhaps the main difference
between Descartes and Heidegger is that Descartes begins with metaphysical claims he thinks he
can know due to his rationality whereas Heidegger begins with what he can know based more
simply on Being-in-the-world. Descartes is up in the clouds theorizing about the world as
though it is first and foremost present-at-hand while Heidegger is down on earth discussing the
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structures that make Descartes’ philosophizing possible at all. In the end, Heidegger is the more
appealing thinker because he is able to provide an account of the human experience that
Descartes’ dualism and radical skepticism simply cannot match.
2.2 Presence-at-Hand and Assertions
Descartes inherited his privileging of the present-at-hand from his predecessors, we have
inherited it from him, and it is this privileging of presence which has, in turn, led us to privilege
the assertion over more primordial disclosures of truth. All assertions operate by making the
‘what’ of the assertion present. “When an assertion has given a definite character to something
present-at-hand, it says something about it as a ‘what’; and this ‘what’ is drawn from that which
is present-at-hand as such” (Heidegger 200). I often make assertions about things which are
already present. For instance, when I experience the entity directly in front of me in the founded
mode of the present-at-hand, I might assert that, “My computer is on.” I know this statement to
be true because my computer is sitting right here in front of me and I am typing on it, therefore,
it must be on. I most likely, however, would not make such an assertion to myself or to someone
who was sitting right beside me because that would be stating the obvious. So suppose I make
this assertion over the phone to my mother. The computer is not present to my mother so she
cannot confirm or deny anything about my computer, but, if I tell her that my computer is on, my
assertion serves the purpose of pointing out and making present for her an entity which is not
actually present.
“Thanks to this articulation, the understanding of what is said becomes public but in such
a way that one acquires a certain access to the subject matter of the talk without the
subject matter itself having to be handy or on hand” (Dahlstrom 284).
There is nothing problematic about any of this until we try and claim that the locus of truth lies
in the assertion. If that were the case, it would be like claiming that my mother has equal access
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to the truth of the Being of my computer as I do. This, however, is not the case. The primordial
disclosure of the state of my computer was disclosed only to me because I was the only one who
was present to have my computer disclosed to me. My mom simply has to take me at my word
when I tell her that my computer is on. The problem with claiming that the locus of truth lies in
the assertion is that it would require us to also claim that my mother and I have equal access to
the truth of the Being of my computer.
Let’s complicate the argument by using a more relevant issue. Suppose I claim that a
particular contemporary political figure is racist. When asked how I know this to be true, I say,
“Well, I read in an article that someone heard her use a racial slur in reference to persons of
African descent.” I do not know this politician; I have never been in her presence, and I,
therefore, have never heard her say anything that might be considered racist. Hence her
allegedly racist remarks were not disclosed to me personally. I am trusting that the article I read
is providing a faithful representation of what was disclosed to the writer of the article; the writer
of the article is, in turn, trusting that her source is accurately characterizing what was disclosed to
her. It is in this way that we come to believe that the locus of truth lies in an assertion. We
simply take others at their word because we either do not want to or are unable to go through the
process of having the issue in question be disclosed to us primordially. So when I call my mom
and say, “Mom, Political Figure X is racist,” she might assume the truth of my statement and
respond by saying, “Oh my, that’s terrible.” As the story gets passed further and further along,
the assertion will become detached from what it was actually about and, once this detachment
occurs, truth comes to be identified with the assertion and not the original disclosure (Dahlstrom
285). “That which is put forward in the assertion is something which can be passed along in
‘further retelling’” (Heidegger 199).
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Heidegger would argue that privileging the assertion is problematic even when it comes
to the realms of math and science. Every child in this country is taught certain things that they
are required to take on faith because they have not experienced the original disclosure
themselves. For instance, as children we all learned Newton’s three laws of motion; we all
learned that the earth was round, and we all learned that area of a circle is
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point, there were brilliant mathematicians and scientists who did the grunt work and experienced
these insights in an originary disclosure. As young students, however, we often simply
memorized the formulas and took them to be true. We assumed that the truth of these claims
was located in the definitions we were taught. There is nothing wrong with learning Newton’s
laws of motion or the Pythagorean Theorem, but as we learn these theories we also need to be
made aware that we missed out on that primordial disclosure. Therefore, it would be a mistake
to go around assuming that we have an unmediated access to the truth of gravity because we
have memorized Newton’s Law’s. Heidegger’s claim is simply that, by locating truth most
primarily in the assertion, we fundamentally misunderstand the nature of truth as disclosure.
“Assertion is not the primary ‘locus’ of truth. On the contrary, whether as a mode in
which uncoveredness is appropriated or as a way of Being-in-the-world, assertion is
grounded in Dasein’s uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness” (Heidegger 269, his
emphasis).
The tradition has passed over the primordial phenomenon of the ready-to-hand and the
truth that is disclosed through that phenomenon. In passing over the phenomenon of the readyto-hand the tradition has ended up privileging the present-at-hand. Although Descartes inherited
his views and does not deserve the full blame for privileging the present-at-hand, he remains the
focus of Heidegger’s critique in Being and Time and therefore in this essay. It is the privileging
of the present-at-hand which enables us to privilege the assertion as the locus of truth because
assertions serve to make present what is absent. By arguing that assertions arise from Being-in31

the-world and truth as aletheia, Heidegger provides a richer understanding of truth and the
human experience.
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CHAPTER 3: TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE, INTUITION, AND ASSERTIONS
3.1 Heidegger’s Analysis of Truth
In section 44 of Being and Time, after Heidegger has laid out the structures of Dasein, he
provides us with an analysis of truth. It is notable that this section is the first mention of truth
aside from his earlier characterization of truth as aletheia in the introduction. Although
Heidegger mentions disclosure frequently in his discussion on instrumentality, he reserves the
term truth for section 44. There are several possible explanations for this. It may be that, since
Heidegger has already characterized truth as unhiddenness (Heidegger 56) and unhiddenness
seems to signify disclosure as an uncovering (Heidegger 105), he sees no real need to state
explicitly that ready-to-hand disclosures are an encounter with truth; in fact, the most primordial
encounter with truth. Perhaps Heidegger waits to bring up an explicit discussion of truth until he
feels that he has adequately criticized the tradition’s view of truth. After all, an in-depth
criticism of the tradition’s view of reality directly precedes the section on truth, and section 44
provides a critique of the correspondence theory.
It is pretty clearly the view of Daniel Dahlstrom and John Sallis (whose reading of
Heidegger will be discussed in the following section) that truth is indeed in operation at the level
of instrumentality. For instance, Dahlstrom claims, “Heidegger argues that the disclosedness of
being-here or, more precisely, the disclosure of the timeliness of being-here, is a truth more
fundamental than any propositional truth” (Dahlstrom xviii). And later in his argument he
claims, “…truth is the original and concrete disclosure of things, the way they make themselves
present and, in that sense, their manner of being” (223). Similarly, the very title of the Sallis
essay that I will be examining in this chapter, The Truth that is not of Knowledge suggests that
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there is a truth that precedes propositional truth, and it will become even clearer in the following
paragraphs that Sallis does think that truth operates in ready-to-hand disclosures.
However, one might disagree with Dahlstrom and Sallis by taking it as significant that
Heidegger waits until section 44 to bring truth back into the discussion. This might imply that,
although disclosure is in operation throughout all modes of Being, truth is only in operation in
the correspondence of the assertion with the present-at-hand being about which the assertion is
made. In Heidegger’s context, truth seems to be closely related to, or even interchangeable with,
disclosure, which supports the readings given by Dahlstrom and Sallis. However, disclosure can
be false. Beings can disclose themselves falsely through semblance, and one’s taking an entity
as something covers over the possibility of its being something else. For instance, my taking a
pen as a writing utensil covers over its possibility of being a back scratcher. At the level of
instrumentality, false disclosures and disclosures that cover over other possible disclosures could
indicate that, while disclosure is in operation at the level of instrumentality, truth is not.
While I am inclined to agree with Dahlstrom and Sallis, we must bear in mind that this is
an interesting ambiguity on Heidegger’s part. Why does he wait until section 44 to bring truth
back into the discussion? And, furthermore, when he does bring truth back into the discussion
why doesn’t he integrate the structures of Dasein into his example on correspondence (this
example will be discussed in the following sections)?
In John Sallis’ reading of Being and Time, Heidegger’s claims signify a radical
reconception and displacement of truth, intuition, and knowledge. Traditionally, it was thought
that truth was bound to knowledge and knowledge to intuition and presence (Sallis 381).
Heidegger seems to be working from Husserl’s notion of intuition which claims that knowledge
arises out of a first-person experience with the world (Smith). In other words, if I perceive a
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table, I can intuitively have knowledge about that table based on my perception of it. Intuition
for Husserl is his:
“…principle of all principles, which requires of all principles that they appeal ultimately
to intuition; intuition is thus posited as the source from which all knowledge is to be
legitimated” (Sallis 386).
Knowledge is thought of in terms of theoretical knowledge, and we gain knowledge about the
world through a present-at-hand examination of it. Through this intuitive, present-at-hand
examination we discover true propositions which we can know to be true because they
correspond to the way the world actually is. Intuition presents the thing itself and is
demonstrative; therefore it is bound to knowledge (Sallis 384). Thus Heidegger notes,
“According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging”
(Heidegger 259). It follows, then, that according to general opinion, truth has its locus in
judgment (Sallis 389). Husserl takes this position on judgment and adds that, when one judges,
“…one must distinguish between the real psychic process and the ideal content of judgment, the
latter (in the case of a true judgment) standing in relation to the real thing judged about” (Sallis
389). In other words, when I see what I perceive to be a box, this represents the ideal content of
my judgment. But I might be wrong; I might actually be looking at a table, in which case the
ideal content might stand in contrast to the actual thing about which I am judging (McGreal 426).
For Heidegger, Husserl is mistaken to grant intuition such primacy and to distinguish
between the ideal content and the real content of judging. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger recognizes
that the fundamental structures of Dasein play a role in what exactly is present for Dasein.
Intuition is linked to consciousness and presupposes a focus on what is bodily present, but, as
Heidegger has pointed out, when Dasein is engaged in its world, bodily presence is disregarded
as the focus remains on a larger project. Intuition and judgment, as Husserl characterizes them,
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would consist in a present-at-hand examination of the things which we perceive through
consciousness. Rejecting Husserl’s privileging of consciousness and bodily presence, Heidegger
posits the notion of Dasein as immersion in the world and argues that things are not primordially
had in their bodily presence because of Dasein’s ready-to-hand, circumspective concern. The
ready-to-hand, “…is a matter not of just perceiving (as it is in intuition) but rather of
apprehending things and others in their involvements in the world” (Sallis 388). Hence, the
world is not first and foremost understood in term of intuition, rather it is understood in terms of
apprehending a larger context which is primordially understood through everyday Being-in-theworld.
Recall that the woman taking notes in her philosophy class was more focused on the
lecture than on her pen and notebook. Even though, physically, her pen and notebook were
closest to her, they were less present to her than the lecture material that she was writing down.
Similarly:
“Heidegger’s example: while writing at a table, one feels the resistance of the table,
which to the extent that it is given in the flesh; and yet, in the strict sense it is not the
table that is there in the flesh, present to the writer, but rather the words that he is writing
and the meaning of what is being written” (Sallis 384).
If the woman taking notes or the man writing on the table were to shift their focus towards what
was bodily present, they would have switched over from the primordial ready-to-hand to the
founded mode of the present-at-hand, but, as long as they remain in a ready-to-hand mode of
Being, their projects are more present to them than what is actually physically present.
Subsequently, if intuition is conceived of as a direct apprehension through a conscious
awareness of what is present, Heidegger would claim that intuition is also a founded mode of
Being that goes along with the present-at-hand. Hence, Heidegger’s introduction of the
structures of Dasein serves to displace the primacy of intuition and presence. He argues that the
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objectifying entailed in intuition is the founded phenomenon of presence-at-hand. Therefore, if
knowledge arises out of intuition, knowing can be defined as presenting (Sallis 388). Knowing
is judging, and to judge is to distinguish between the actual physical object and the ideal content
of the judgment.
It is with this background in mind that Heidegger proposes his analysis. He asks, “When
does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowledge itself? It does so when such knowing
demonstrates itself as true” (Heidegger 259). Now Heidegger’s task is to provide his analysis of
the demonstration in which truth comes to show itself as true.
Heidegger provides us with an example to illustrate his point. Suppose that a man
standing with his back to the wall makes the true assertion that the picture on the wall is askew.
When he turns around and sees that the picture on the wall is indeed askew, the truth of his
assertion is demonstrated. When the man turns around and actually sees the picture, he perceives
the truth of his assertion.
“What comes up for confirmation is that this entity is being pointed out by the Being in
which the assertion is made—which is Being towards what is put forward in the
assertion; thus what is to be confirmed is that such Being uncovers the entity towards
which it is…In carrying out such a demonstration, the knowing remains related solely to
the entity itself” (Heidegger 261).
In other words, when we make assertions about beings in the world what we have in mind is the
concrete being of the ‘what’ of the assertion and nothing more. Moreover, although Heidegger
concedes that we do have mental representations of entities, he argues that it is mistaken to posit
a disconnection between the real and the ideal content of judgment. Once again, Heidegger is
trying to pull philosophy down from the clouds back to the concrete experiences of the world. In
doing so, he must dispel the belief that assertions are true based on their agreement of the mind’s
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intuitive representations with the way the world actually is. Rather, it is the assertion’s accurate
uncovering of the Being of the painting that demonstrates the truth of assertion.
“…the truth of the assertion consists in saying the thing itself just as that thing comes to
show itself, in its uncovering that thing just as that thing proves demonstrably to be, in
short, in its being-uncovering” (Sallis 390).
This example illustrates Heidegger’s claim that assertions can only arise out of Being-inthe-world. We cannot make assertions about things in the world without having first
encountered them on some more fundamental level. In other words, the man who claims that the
picture on the wall is askew cannot make any such claim without, first, having encountered the
picture as a present being in the world that exists within his circumspective concern. He is not
mentally representing the notion of crooked pictures in his mind; he is simply thinking of the
picture that has been presented to him on the wall. Heidegger’s point is that the reason the man
was able to make an assertion about this picture was because the picture, in its presence,
disclosed itself to him. This example sounds pretty similar to some claims made by
correspondence theorists, and that’s because it is; however, Heidegger is not contradicting
himself. According to Heidegger, correspondence between an assertion and a state of affairs is a
perfectly acceptable form of knowing the world theoretically in the realm of the present-at-hand.
The man who makes the assertion about the picture has already conceived of the picture as
present-at-hand; therefore, there is nothing problematic about invoking correspondence to
display the truth of his assertion. What is missing in this example is the twist Heidegger
provides for correspondence. Assertions about beings in the world are not made in vacuums.
They are made by people who have certain orientations in the world, and, in particular, regarding
the beings about which the assertion is being made. Strangely Heidegger does not throw this
twist into this particular example but it is implied by his earlier analyses of Being-in-the-world.
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The man’s orientation in the world undoubtedly impacted this disclosure. Heidegger
could have made this example more relevant to his claims about Being-in-the-world if he had
provided some context for the man making the assertion. For instance, suppose this man was an
interior decorator. It makes sense that an interior decorator would notice an askew picture
almost immediately because much of his circumspective concern is oriented towards the project
of hanging picture on walls. If the man were a philosopher, meditating on Being, however, it
would stand to reason that he might not notice a crooked picture. His orientation in the world
may have heightened his ability to think critically, but also limited his ability to notice things like
crooked pictures on walls.
“Heidegger could have extended the analysis and integrated it more radically in the
analysis of Dasein, had he gone on to introduce another example, one in which the selfshowing of the thing spoken of would have taken the form, not of perception, but of
circumspective concern. For at least to this extent truth would, then, have been detached
from knowledge as intuition” (Sallis 390).
Heidegger fails to contextualize his example perhaps because he thinks it is already implied by
his earlier analysis of Being-in-the-world which, it is important to note, sets the stage for this
analysis. However, as I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, it is also conceivable that he
did not contextualize this example on purpose. It all depends on whether or not Heidegger thinks
that truth is in operation at the level of circumspective concern. The above quote makes Sallis’
position clear, but one might contend that it was not an oversight on Heidegger’s part to exclude
circumspective concern from his example. If Heidegger does want to reserve truth for assertions,
it was most likely an intentional omission on his part.
Nevertheless, in this reading, Heidegger’s analysis in section 44 still signifies a turn away
from truth as it is most often thought of in terms of knowledge, intuition, and judgment towards
truth as being-uncovering. Sallis posits the move Heidegger makes in section 44 as a doubling
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of truth, “…doubling truth as being-uncovering, doubling it with the originary phenomenon of
truth, which is the ontological condition of possibility of truth being-uncovering” (Sallis 390).
Particularly if we impute a context of Being-in-the-world onto Heidegger’s example of the man
making an assertion about an askew picture it becomes clear that Heidegger is claiming that the
truth that is disclosed through the assertion is only possible based on a more concrete Being-inthe-world. In Sallis and Dahlstrom’s reading of Heidegger, what makes the uncovering of the
picture possible, namely Being-in-the-world, should be considered true in a more originary sense
than truth as it is conceived of as knowledge, intuition, and judgment. Disclosedness as it occurs
through circumspective concern and ready-to-hand dealings with the world is, therefore, “…a
matter neither of intuition nor for intuition. The originary phenomenon of truth, truth, as
disclosedness, is a truth that is not of knowledge” (Sallis 390, his emphasis).
3.2 Heidegger’s Characterization of Assertions
Once Heidegger has adequately characterized the different modes of disclosure, namely
the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, he is ready to explain how the assertion fits in within
his overall scheme. An assertion is the form of discourse which gives beings a definite character.
For Heidegger, there are three significations to the term ‘assertion’ all of which are made
possible on the basis of ready-to-hand encounters with the world.
First, the most primary signification of asserting is pointing out (Heidegger 196). This
signification lets the entity, “be seen from itself” (Heidegger 196). To illustrate, Heidegger
provides us with the assertion, “The hammer is too heavy”. Seemingly, this assertion allows the
hammer to remain within its ready-to-hand context if we interpret the assertion as a means of
saying, “This hammer is too heavy for me to use in the project that I am currently engaged in”.
In other words, I need another hammer. Furthermore, this statement would only make sense to
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someone who understood the context in which I was operating because it assumes knowledge of
that context. If one construction worker were to make that assertion to another construction
worker, for instance, the other construction worker would know precisely what she meant.
However, if the construction worker were to call her husband and make that assertion, he might
wonder, “…too heavy for what?”.
The second signification of assertion is predication (Heidegger 196). Assertions
predicate thereby giving the object of the assertion a definite character. The assertion, “The
hammer is too heavy” gives the hammer the character of heaviness. In this assertion it is not the
predicate that is put forward but the hammer itself; however, it is a narrow conception of the
hammer that is brought into view and this limits our understanding of the hammer to the definite
character of heaviness the assertion gives it (Heidegger 196). Heidegger contends that the
second characterization is grounded in the first. “Within this pointing-out, the elements which
are Articulated in predication—the subject and the predicate—arise” (Heidegger 197). It is not
through the predication that the hammer shows itself; it is through the pointing out. When we
predicate we actually limit our view of the hammer to what we have predicated.
The third signification for assertions is communication (Heidegger 197). Assertions are a
way of communicating something about a being to someone else. This signification is grounded
in the first and second significations because they provide the basis for communication. “It is
letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character”
(Heidegger 197). When I assert to someone else that the hammer is too heavy, I share my way
of Being-towards what has been pointed out. The person does not necessarily have to be there
with me for me to share this assertion. In sharing the events of my day, I might explain that the
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hammer I was using earlier was too heavy, and this is a way of communicating my Beingtowards-the-hammer to someone who was not physically there to share in it.
At the end of this analysis Heidegger provides his final definition of assertions. An
assertion, he says, “is a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which
communicates” (Heidegger 199). He goes on to argue that it is necessary to recognize that
assertions are not, “…a free-floating kind of behavior which, in its own right, might be capable
of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary, it always maintains itself on
the basis of Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 199). Hence, I cannot make an assertion about a
hammer being too heavy if I have not encountered the hammer through my Being-in-the-world,
or if I have had someone else disclose the hammer to me by pointing out that it is too heavy.
When I do make the assertion that the hammer is too heavy, it is implied that I have a foreconception of the hammer based on my encounter with it through Being-in-the-world.
3.3 Dahlstrom’s Reading of Heidegger
The above analysis of assertions helps to elucidate Heidegger’s argument that assertions
are possible based on ready-to-hand encounters with Being-in-the-world. However, in light of
the radical claims that provide the backdrop for this analysis, it is disappointing that Heidegger
does not engage in a more in-depth discussion of assertions. For instance, if assertions can
operate as a pointing-out this would suggest that they can arise from the ready-to-hand as well as
the present-at-hand, whereas assertions as predication seemingly only arise through present-athand modes of Being. Additionally, Heidegger claims that assertions communicate uncovering
to others. Does this imply that the sole purpose of assertions is to communicate more primordial
disclosures to others? Does the person doing the asserting already have knowledge of the
uncovering or is the act of assertion an uncovering in itself? If we conceive of assertions as
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verbal utterances it would seem that communication would be their main objective (i.e.
communicating one’s disclosure to others); however, if we conceive of assertions as occurring
through thought, as well, then we can still claim that they operate as a disclosure to the person
doing the asserting. These are all distinctions Heidegger fails to make and so we are left to our
own devices in our attempt to flesh out precisely what his analysis implies. A discussion of
Daniel Dahlstrom’s reading of Heidegger’s analysis of assertions might shed some light on the
subject. Dahlstrom expresses the same frustration I have conveyed with Heidegger’s scanty
analysis of assertions: “Heidegger leaves a great deal to be desired in elaborating the relations
among these three [significations]” (Dahlstrom 203). Like myself, Dahlstrom is left to make
conjectures about what Heidegger may have meant.
Whereas Heidegger uses the same assertion, “The hammer is too heavy,” to characterize
all three significations of asserting, Dahlstrom opts to use three different assertions to
characterize the differing significations involved in asserting which he characterizes respectively
as unthematic, circumspectively thematic, and theoretically thematic; these characterizations
seem to correlate to assertions as pointing out, predication, and communication (Dahlstrom 204).
Additionally, Dahlstrom interprets the different significations of assertions as operating on
different levels, and reads Heidegger as doing the same.
“In keeping with this brief synopsis of the characteristics of assertions, Heidegger
observes that they can be made on different levels, between the extremes of full
‘absorption in some preoccupation’ and ‘pure determining,’ that is, a strictly theoretical
assertion” (Dahlstrom 203).
An example of an unthematic/pointing-out assertion would be, “The pen is out of ink.”
This assertion reveals or points something out about the pen, without explicitly thematizing it. In
other words, this statement does not view the pen from a present-at-hand perspective. Through
my assertion, I am revealing the pen as out of ink. I am not describing what the pen is or what
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its purpose is; the statement already presupposes knowledge of the pen. Instead I am pointing
out something about the pen in relation to its usefulness as a ready-to-hand tool. Although, in
this case, I am actually pointing out the cessation of its usefulness as a ready-to-hand tool.
An example of a circumspectively thematic/predicative assertion would be, “The pen
writes on the paper.” This type of assertion does thematize the subject, namely the pen, but it
only thematizes it circumspectively. In other words, the pen is only thematized in relation to the
purpose it serves, and in relation to the context in which it operates (Dahlstrom 204).
Furthermore, unlike the first assertion, this statement provides some definite character as to what
precisely the pen is; it reveals the pen as a tool for writing, and it takes the pen out of its readyto-hand, hidden context in order to do so.
An example of a theoretically-thematic/communicative assertion would be, “The pen is
purple.” This statement thematizes the pen, not circumspectively and in relation to a larger
context, but theoretically and as purely present-at-hand (Dahlstrom 204). It removes the pen
from its usual context in order to examine it on a more theoretical level.
Dahlstrom’s characterization of assertions seems to suggest that there are actually three
different types of assertions rather than one type of assertion with three differing significations.
He goes on to argue that the first level of asserting always pervades the others, suggesting that, at
least some, assertions are capable of operating simultaneously at more than one level (Dahlstrom
205). The first level of assertion would thus disclose an original meaning, and the theoretical
asserting contained in the second and third levels would remain dependent upon that first level.
If we conceive of assertions, like Dahlstrom, as being able to operate simultaneously at
more than one level then it would seem that an assertion can be ready-to-hand or present-at-hand
and maybe even both at once. It would also follow that assertions, if they are to be conceived of
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as an original disclosure, must be capable of occurring silently, through thought and not just
through speaking or writing. 12 Once again, Heidegger could have made his explication clearer
had he chosen to provide context for his examples.
Let’s imagine for example that I am alone in my apartment building a book shelf. In
order to do this, I have purchased a tool kit that, among other things, contains two hammers of
differing sizes. I removed the larger hammer and some nails and began working. Suppose that
after about thirty seconds of futile hammering I stop and think to myself, “This hammer is too
heavy.” I have made an assertion, although silently and to myself. This assertion discloses the
hammer to me in that it points out that the hammer is too heavy for me to be using. Prior to the
assertion, the heaviness of the hammer had not yet been disclosed to me; it was only through my
silent assertion that I came to see the hammer as too heavy. Now that I have made my assertion
that the hammer is too heavy, I have another option open to me. I can cast aside the heavy
hammer in favor of a lighter one. Assuming that I knew all along that the lighter hammer was
my fallback option, my assertion could be conceived of a ready-to-hand means of saying, “I need
another hammer.” Thus, this assertion, in this particular context only invokes the first level of
asserting.
Now suppose that the tool kit I had purchased only had one hammer, the very same
hammer that is too heavy. Again, I begin to hammer and about thirty seconds later I give up and
assert, “The hammer is too heavy.” At this point, I must view the hammer as present-at-hand
because my project of building my bookshelf has been completely interrupted. Now I am left
staring at slabs of wood and a hammer that is too heavy for me to use. The first level of asserting
is still in operation here because I have still pointed out something about the hammer through my
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Wittgenstein makes a similar distinction in his discussion of private language in Philosophical Investigations
Paragraph 243
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assertion. The second level must also be in operation because I have made a predication about
the hammer, and I have limited my view of it. Now when I look at the hammer my view is
limited by my assertion that it is too heavy. The third level is not in operation, because there is
no one around for me to communicate with.
Finally, suppose that I take my hammer back to the store to return it. When I speak to the
cashier, I explain to her that it was too heavy. Here all three levels of asserting are in operation.
I am pointing out something about the hammer, by predicating it, and I am also communicating
by inviting the cashier to share in the disclosure about the hammer which I have had. Thus, in
this particular context, all three levels of asserting are being utilized simultaneously.
Ultimately, however, it seems that I must reject the first example (in which the assertion
about the hammer leaves it in its ready-to-hand context) if I am to maintain my earlier definition,
from section 2.2, that all assertions operate by making the ‘what’ of the assertion present. If that
is the case, then all assertions serve to make the subject of the assertion present-at-hand.
Heidegger seems to agree with this view as he also characterizes assertions as a making presentat-hand:
“If this entity [the hammer] becomes the object of an assertion, then as soon as we begin
this assertion, there is already a change-over in the fore-having. Something ready-tohand with which we have to do or perform something, turns into something about which
the assertion that points out is made…When an assertion has given a definite character to
something present-at-hand, it says something about it as a ‘what’; and this ‘what’ is
drawn from what is present-at-hand as such” (Heidegger 200).
It seems, then, that we cannot characterize assertions as ready-to-hand. I must conclude that the
statement, “The hammer is too heavy,” cannot possibly operate as ready-to-hand because it
necessarily involves positing an ‘about which’ in regards to the hammer. Even if only
momentarily, before I cast aside my hammer in favor for a smaller one, my assertion, “The
hammer is too heavy,” has made the hammer present. Now the ‘as’ of the hammer no longer
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references a totality of involvements, because I only see the hammer, in a definite way, through
presence-at-hand.
Moreover, in light of Heidegger’s definition of assertions as “a pointing-out which gives
something a definite character and which communicates,” it seems that we ought to reject
Dahlstrom’s levels theory altogether. At no point does Heidegger characterize assertions in
terms of levels; rather, he characterizes them in terms of significations, and although he does
grant priority to the first signification, since it grounds the others, in the end, he defines assertion
using all three significations. If we examine the assertions used to illustrate Dahlstrom’s three
levels of asserting, we can see that all three significations are actually in operation in all three
assertions.
The assertion, “The pen is out of ink,” for instance, not only points something definite
about the pen, it also predicates the pen to a particular way of being: unready-to-hand.
Moreover, just as Heidegger claims, this predication restricts my view of the pen to being out of
ink. Finally, if we conceive of assertions as self-communication in addition to communicating to
others, then we can also claim that the third signification is in operation. Regardless of whether I
am alone and aver to myself that the pen is out of ink, or make the assertion to someone else, I
am communicating a definite character of the pen. Heidegger never makes a distinction between
self-communication and communicating with others, and his passage on communicative
asserting seems to suggest that he is only thinking in terms of communicating with others.
However, if we are to conceive of assertions as disclosive in their own right, it seems to me that
we must also conceive of assertions as a means of self-communication. Assertions about
present-at-hand beings can communicate a particular aspect of a being to myself.
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Similarly, the assertion, “The pen writes on the paper,” can also be seen as utilizing all
three significations. This assertion points something out about the usefulness of the pen,
predicates it for a specific purpose (once I conceive of the pen as a tool for writing I am
restricted from viewing it, say, as a tool for scratching my back), and communicates a useful way
in which to use the pen. Finally, “The pen is purple,” also can be viewed as using all three
significations; it points something definite out about the pen, it predicates the pen, and it
communicates something about the pen regardless of whether it is to oneself or to another.
Heidegger’s final definition of assertions as an invocation of all three significations
simultaneously, strongly suggests that Dahlstrom is mistaken in his characterizing assertions as
operating on levels.
However, before we give up on Dahlstrom completely let us examine another distinction
he makes that might be a bit more helpful. Dahlstrom’s analysis aptly points out that
Heidegger’s account of assertions switches back and forth (without clarification) between talk of
the “assertion” and talk of the “asserting”. “…’assertion’ stands at times for the act of asserting
(along with the distinctive intentional character that Heidegger accords it), at other times for
what is asserted (in the sense of the means, object, or even the result of asserting)” (Dahlstrom
201). Dahlstrom goes on to claim that this ambiguity points to a distinction Heidegger seems to
want to make:
“While an assertion might be confused with a sentence or word-complex and treated as
something handy or on hand, the asserting remains at bottom an existential, albeit
derivative of the basic discursiveness of being-here” (Dahlstrom 201).
If Dahlstrom is right, the act of asserting itself can be a form of disclosure similar to, but
derivative of, the ‘as’ structure discussed in chapter one. Just as taking a certain entity to be a
door or a pen uncovers that entity as such, the act of asserting also invokes truth as aletheia in
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that it points out or uncovers something definite about a being through the three significations of
asserting: pointing out, predication, and communication.
Dahlstrom is less clear regarding his claim that the assertion itself can be handy or on
hand, however, he seems to think that assertions become ready-to-hand when they are used ad
infinitum to hold a particular disclosure open. This claim hearkens back to my argument in
chapter two. Recall that I argued that students are taught certain principles that they must take
on faith because they did not have the luxury of experiencing the original disclosure that gave
birth to the principle. For instance, Sir Isaac Newton once asserted that, “Whenever a particle A
exerts a force on another particle B, B simultaneously exerts a force on A with the same
magnitude in the opposite direction.” This assertion was made based on a particular disclosure,
experienced by Newton. However, suppose the students learning this material do not experience
the same disclosure that engendered Newton’s insight; rather, they memorized the assertion and
took it to be true based on faith. In this case, the assertion itself, but not Newton’s act of
asserting can be seen as ready-to-hand.
Newton’s act of asserting was an existential act which made the ‘what’ of his assertion
present. “As a manner of Being-in-the-world, making an assertion is a way of taking
(uncovering) things, specifically by pointing them out and thus making it possible to see them,
perhaps even for what they are” (Dahlstrom 202). This act of asserting, however, must be
distinguished from the assertion itself which can be taken as ready-to-hand as it becomes a tool
for holding open an original disclosure. When the assertion gets passed along, “…things that are
used and thus originally (hermeneutically, interpretively) understood in a tacit nonthematic
interaction with them are flattened into things merely on hand” (Dahlstrom 206).
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After a close reading of Heidegger’s analysis of assertions and Dahlstrom’s interpretation
of Heidegger’s analysis, we can make several conclusions regarding assertions. (1) They always
involve making the ‘what’ of the assertion present-at-hand. (2) Assertions have three
significations: pointing out, predicating, and communicating. (3) Asserting can be done as a
form of communicating to others or as self-communication, through thought. 4) The act of
asserting is a modification of the primordial ‘as’ structure of understanding; this can be
contrasted with the assertion itself which can operate as a ready-to-hand tool which holds certain
disclosures open.
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CONCLUSION
Heidegger’s interest in the question of Being led him into the largely unexplored terrain
of the most primordial ways we interact with our world. In chapter one, I show how he
successfully illustrated that the disclosure of beings are most fundamentally encountered through
the phenomenon of the ready-to-hand, a phenomenon which has been largely overlooked by the
tradition. Chapter two provides a criticism of Descartes’ ontology in which I demonstrate how
Descartes’ view of the world led him to privilege present-at-hand views of the world, leading
him to ignore the phenomenon of the ready-to-hand.
The first two chapters (1) outlined Heidegger’s basic project in the first division of Being
and Time and (2) showed how his views comprise a radical critique of the tradition. In section
3.1, I show how Heidegger’s recognition that presence-at-hand is a founded mode of Being
enabled him to critique the correspondence theorist’s claim that truth belongs solely to the
assertion. Truth only belongs to the assertion insofar as assertions are a modification of the ‘as’
structure, a structure that only arises from Being-in-the-world in general.
Having established that truth can only arise from Being-in-the-world I went on to discuss
Heidegger’s analysis of assertions. Just like the ready-to-hand, assertions take entities ‘as’ such
and such, thereby pointing them out, predicating them, and communicating disclosure about
them. Correspondence theory can and should play a role in the disclosures that happen through
assertions, but one must always bear in mind that this phenomenon arises from the structures
inherent in Being-in-the-world. In other words, assertions and the truth that comes from them do
not occur in a vacuum. They are based on the structures of Dasein and Dasein’s particular
orientation in the world.
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Because Heidegger’s section on assertions is somewhat brief, I also examined Daniel
Dahlstrom’s interpretation of Heidegger. I concluded that he was mistaken to claim that
assertions operate on different levels. Heidegger never characterizes them as such; rather he
contends that assertions have three significations which are in operation in every assertion.
However, Dahlstrom does make another distinction that I conclude is correct. He distinguishes
between the act of asserting and the assertion itself. The act of asserting is always an existential
act, performed by Dasein, which makes the ‘what’ of the assertion present. In contrast, the
assertion itself can be ready-to-hand if it is used to hold open a certain disclosure.
One difficulty that was raised by my paper was the question of whether or not truth is in
operation at the level of the ready-to-hand. Clearly, Sallis and Dahlstrom think that it is, but they
seem to have overlooked the fact that Heidegger never uses the word truth in his discussion of
circumspective concern. Instead he uses the word disclosure, and he is quite explicit that
disclosures can be false. One might defend Sallis and Dahlstrom by arguing that disclosure is
synonymous with aletheia, and Heidegger’s omission of the word ‘truth’ is his way of trying to
radically redefine truth. However, this might be a dubious claim considering that Heidegger
does not explicitly link the terms aletheia and disclosure. Although this question is not
problematized in great detail in this essay, it is a fascinating question that could be the object of
future research.
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